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ABSTRACT
Network operators often face the problem of remote outages in
transit networks leading to significant (sometimes on the order of
minutes) downtimes. The issue is that BGP, the Internet routing
protocol, often converges slowly upon such outages, as large bursts
of messages have to be processed and propagated router by router.
In this paper, we present SWIFT, a fast-reroute framework which
enables routers to restore connectivity in few seconds upon remote
outages. SWIFT is based on two novel techniques. First, SWIFT
deals with slow outage notification by predicting the overall extent
of a remote failure out of few control-plane (BGP) messages. The
key insight is that significant inference speed can be gained at
the price of some accuracy. Second, SWIFT introduces a new data-
plane encoding scheme, which enables quick and flexible update of
the affected forwarding entries. SWIFT is deployable on existing
devices, without modifying BGP.
We present a complete implementation of SWIFT and demon-
strate that it is both fast and accurate. In our experiments with real
BGP traces, SWIFT predicts the extent of a remote outage in few
seconds with an accuracy of ∼90% and can restore connectivity for
99% of the affected destinations.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many applications nowadays require continuous Internet connec-
tivity, where even the slightest downtime can cause large financial
and reputational loss. For example, the cost of one minute of down-
time for Amazon or Google easily reaches a 6-digit number [2]
and almost any outage that they experience makes the news [4, 8].
Smaller Internet players are not better off. Across the networking
industry, the average cost of downtime is estimated to be about
$8,000 per minute [55].
Unfortunately, guaranteeing always-on connectivity Internet-
wide is a big challenge for network operators. Even if their network
is perfectly resilient, they still face the problem of remote outages in
transit networks, i.e., connectivity disruptions in external networks
forwarding their traffic. These disruptions are frequent: large net-
works routinely see tens of failures or configuration changes in any
single day [12, 26, 28, 35, 65], each potentially disrupting transit
traffic for thousands of destinations.
Problem. BGP, the Internet routing protocol, converges slowly
upon remote outages. This can result in long data-plane downtime
for many destinations, including popular ones. Our measurements
on real BGP traces and recent router platforms (§2) show that:
– large bursts of BGP withdrawals (>1.5k prefixes) regularly hap-
pen in the Internet: 53% (resp. 86%) of ≈200 BGP sessions dis-
tributed worldwide see at least one large burst per week (resp.
month). Since single routers in transit networks routinely main-
tain tens to hundreds of such BGP sessions [27], the probability
of receiving a burst is important. 9.5% of these bursts involve
more than 20k prefixes, and some involve up to 560k prefixes.
Nearly all the biggest (hence slowest) bursts include prefixes for
popular destinations (Google, Akamai, Netflix, etc.).
– similarly to what prior studies have shown (e.g., [18, 37, 43, 45, 53,
62, 63, 66]), BGP slow convergence can cause dozens of seconds
of data-plane downtime, during which packets towards many
destinations are lost. We confirmed data-plane losses with both
testbed experiments on commercial routers and private conver-
sations with operators.
To further substantiate the problem, we conducted a survey with
72 operators. Our survey indicates that slow BGP convergence
is a widespread concern. According to the operators monitoring
convergence time (47% of them), BGP takes more than 30 seconds to
converge upon remote outages, on average.
Local fast-reroute upon remote outages.We present SWIFT, a
fast-reroute framework that enables a router to restore connectivity
in few seconds upon remote outages. SWIFT is based on two main
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ingredients. Immediately after receiving the first BGP messages of a
burst, a SWIFTED router runs an inference algorithm to localize
the outage and predict which prefixes will be affected—a sort of
time-bound Root Cause Analysis (RCA). Based on this inference,
the SWIFTED router reroutes the potentially affected prefixes on
paths unaffected by the inferred failure. As many prefixes may
have to be rerouted at once, SWIFT also includes a data-plane
encoding scheme that enables the router to flexibly match and
reroute all prefixes affected by a remote failure with few data-plane
rule updates.
Balancing inference accuracy & speed, with correctness &
performance in mind. SWIFT restores connectivity within few
seconds by inferring the failure from a single vantage point. This
contrasts to prior RCA studies (e.g., [15, 19, 23, 36, 39, 40, 68–70]),
which aim at finding causes of outages within minutes, hence can
benefit from more flexibility in terms of inference algorithms and
input sources (e.g., active probing from multiple vantage points).
The key insight behind SWIFT inference algorithm is that some
accuracy can be traded for a significant gain in speed. Identify-
ing the topological region where an outage is happening is indeed
much faster than precisely locating the outage within that region.
By rerouting traffic around the region, a SWIFTED router immedi-
ately restores connectivity for the affected prefixes at the cost of
temporarily forwarding few (according to our results) unaffected
prefixes on alternate working paths.
SWIFTmakes sure that the effect of diverting non-affected traffic
does not trump the benefit of saving traffic towards the affected
prefixes. First of all, we prove that rerouting non-affected traffic is
safe: SWIFT does not lead to forwarding anomalies, even if multiple
routers and ASes deploy it. Second, SWIFT selects the alternate
paths taking into account the operator’s policies (e.g., type of peers,
cost model) and performance criteria (e.g., by preventing to reroute
large amount of traffic to low-bandwidth paths).
Deployment. SWIFT is deployable on a per-router basis and does
not require cooperation between ASes, nor changes to BGP. SWIFT
can be deployed with a simple software update, since the only
hardware requirement, a two-stage forwarding table, is readily
available in recent router platforms [3].
Whenever a SWIFTED router fast-reroutes upon an outage, it
guarantees connectivity to all the traffic sources passing through
it. Hence, deploying SWIFT in a few central ASes would bene-
fit the entire Internet, since these ASes would also protect their
(non-SWIFTED) customers. The same applies within a network:
deploying few SWIFTED routers at the edge boosts convergence
network-wide. A full Internet SWIFT deployment would achieve
the utmost advantages of our scheme, as it guarantees ASes to
reroute quickly, independently, and consistently with their policies.
Performance.We implemented SWIFT and used our implementa-
tion to perform extensive experiments using both real and synthetic
BGP traces. Across all our experiments, SWIFT correctly identified
90% of the affected prefixes within 2 seconds. Moreover, a SWIFTED
router can fast reroute 99% of the predicted prefixes with few data-
plane rule updates, i.e., in milliseconds. Finally, we show that our
implementation is practical by using it to reduce the convergence
time of a recent Cisco router by more than 98%.
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Figure 1: Example of slow convergence upon a remote out-
age: routing policies and absence of information about phys-
ical connectivity force AS 1 towait for 11k BGPwithdrawals,
one per prefix owned by AS 6 or AS 8.
Contributions. Our main contributions are:
• A thorough analysis of the problem of slow BGP convergence
upon remote outages, including a survey with 72 operators and
measurements on real BGP traces and routers (§2);
• A framework, SWIFT, which enables existing routers to quickly
restore connectivity upon such outages (§3);
• Algorithms for quickly inferring disrupted resources from few
BGP updates (§4) and enabling fast data-plane rerouting (§5);
• An open-source implementation of SWIFT,1 together with a
thorough evaluation (§6) based on real-world BGP traces along
with simulations. Among others, we show that SWIFT achieves
a prediction accuracy and an encoding efficiency above 90%;
• A case study showing that SWIFT can reduce the convergence
time of recent Cisco routers by 98% (§7).
2 THE CASE FOR SWIFT
In this section, we show that slow BGP convergence upon remote
outages is practically relevant. We first discuss the causes for slow
BGP convergence and its effects on data-plane connectivity in a
controlled environment (§2.1). We then present measurements on
real BGP traces and feedback from operators: they demonstrate
that slow convergence problems occur in the Internet and can lead
to significant traffic losses, even for popular destinations (§2.2).
2.1 Slow BGP convergence can cause
significant data-plane losses
We describe an example of slow BGP convergence using the net-
work in Fig. 1(a). Each AS i originates a distinct set of prefixes Si .
We focus on the 21k prefixes of S6, S7 and S8, before and after the
failure of the link (5, 6). Contrary to what happens in the current
Internet (see §2.2.3), we assume that all ASes deploy existing fast-
reroute technologies [11, 25, 38, 61]. Those technologies allow each
AS to quickly restore connectivity upon a local outage, provided
they have a backup path available.
Fig. 1(a) and Fig. 1(b) respectively show pre- and post-failure
AS paths. AS 5 knows an alternate path for S7 (via AS 3) before
the failure. However, because of inter-domain policies (e.g., partial
1https://github.com/nsg-ethz/swift
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transit [60]), it does not know any backup path for S6 and S8: for
those prefixes, AS 5 recovers connectivity after the failure via AS 2.
After the failure of (5, 6), AS 5 restores connectivity for S7 almost
immediately by rerouting traffic to its alternate path (through AS 3).
Since AS 5 does not have backup paths for S6 and S8, a blackhole is
created for any flow directed to the corresponding 11k prefixes. In
the control plane, the failure causes AS 5 to send 10k path updates
to notify that it now uses new paths to reach S7, along with 11k path
withdrawals to communicate the unavailability of path (5, 6, 8).
2.1.1 BGP information hiding slows down convergence.
For AS 1 and AS 2, the failure of (5,6) is a remote outage, which
comes with loss of traffic towards S6 and S8. Convergence is inher-
ently slow, since AS 1 and AS 2 only have information about the
best paths used by their neighbors and not all the available ones.
Upon the failure, AS 1 and AS 2 are indeed forced to wait for the
propagation of a large stream of path updates and withdrawals,
potentially arriving one prefix at the time. BGP update packing [58]
can reduce the number of messages by grouping updates together.
However, this mechanism only works if identical BGP attributes are
attached to the prefixes to group – which is often not the case due to
the widespread use of BGP communities [21]. The absolute number
of messages is not the only causes of slow BGP convergence: other
reasons include slow table transfer [13], timers [49, 54] and TCP
stack implementation [1].
Slow convergence is a fundamental feature of inter-domain rout-
ing. Two factors contribute to it. First, routing information must be
propagated on a per-prefix basis, because any single AS can apply
distinct routing policies, hence use different paths, on a per-prefix
basis. Second, routing messages cannot specify network resources
that failed, because AS topologies and policies are hidden by the
routing system (mainly for scalability and AS-level privacy).
2.1.2 Effect on data-plane connectivity.
To quantify how badly slow control-plane convergence can affect
data-plane connectivity, we reproduced the network in Fig. 1 with
recent Cisco routers (Cisco Nexus 7000 C7018, running NX-OS
v6.2). We then measured the downtime experienced by the AS 1
router upon the failure of (5, 6). In successive experiments, we
configured AS 6 to advertise a growing number of prefixes up to
290,000 (roughly half of the current full Internet routing table [5]).
As in [26], we injected traffic towards 100 IP addresses randomly
selected among prefixes advertised by AS 6, and measured the time
taken by AS 1 to retrieve connectivity for all of the probed prefixes.
This methodology provided us with a lower bound estimation of
the downtime that any prefix in the burst could experience.
Recent routers can lose traffic for dozens of seconds upon
remote outages. Table 1 reports the downtime seen by the AS 1
router. Immediately after the link failure, the router starts to drop
packets for all monitored IPs. Connectivity is gradually recovered
as withdrawals are received from AS 2 and traffic is redirected to
AS 3. The evolution of the downtime is roughly linear: for 290k
prefixes, the router takes 109 s to fully converge.
Withdrawals Downtime (sec)
10k 3.8
50k 19.0
100k 37.9
290k 109.0
Table 1: Data-plane downtime experienced by AS 1 in Fig. 1
as a function of the burst size. Even for relatively small
bursts, traffic is lost for tens of seconds.
2.2 Slow BGP convergence in the Internet
We now report evidence of slow BGP convergence in the Internet,
along with a discussion on its data-plane impact and on the network
operators’ perspectives.
2.2.1 Bursts of withdrawals propagate slowly.
We measured the duration of bursts of BGP withdrawals ex-
tracted from 213 RouteViews [51] and RIPE RIS [9] peering ses-
sions during November 2016. We extracted the bursts using a 10 s
sliding window: a burst starts (resp. stops) when the number of
withdrawals contained in the window is above (resp. below) a given
threshold. We choose 1,500 and 9 withdrawals for the start and
stop threshold respectively, which correspond to the 99.99th and
the 90th percentile of the number of withdrawals received over any
10 s period. Overall, we found a total of 3,335 bursts; 16% of them
(525) contained more than 10,000 withdrawals, and 1.5% of them
(49) contained more than 100,000 withdrawals. Our measurements
expose four major observations.
BGP routers often see bursts ofwithdrawals.We computed the
number of bursts that would be observed by a router maintaining
a growing number of peering sessions randomly selected amongst
the 213 RouteViews and RIPE RIS peering sessions. Fig. 2(a) shows
our results. The line in the box represents the median value, while
the whiskers map to the 5th and the 95th percentile. In the median
case, a router maintaining 30 peering sessions would see 104 (resp.
33) bursts of at least 5k (resp. 25k) withdrawals over a month. Even
if a router maintains a single session, it would likely see a few large
bursts each month. Indeed, 62% of the individual BGP sessions we
considered saw between 1 and 10 bursts of withdrawals, 24% saw
more than 10 bursts. Only 14% of the sessions did not see any. As a
comparison, single routers in transit networks routinely maintain
tens to hundreds of sessions [27] – even if not all those sessions
might carry the same number of prefixes as the ones in our dataset.
Learning the full extent of an outage is slow. While most of
the bursts arrived within 10 s, 37% (1,239) of them lasted more than
10 s, and 9.7% (314) lasted more than 30 s (see Fig. 2(b)). This also
means that withdrawals within bursts tend to take a long time to
be received. In the median case (resp. 75th percentile), BGP takes
13 s (resp. 32 s) to receive a withdrawal.
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Figure 2: Size and duration of bursts captured from 213 BGP
vantage points in November 2016.
Large bursts take more time to be learned. Unsurprisingly,
large bursts take more time to propagate than smaller ones (see
Fig. 2(b)). Overall, we found that 98 bursts took more than 1min to
arrive, with an average size of ≈81k withdrawals.
A significant portion of the withdrawals arrive at the end of
the bursts. We took the bursts lasting 10 s or more and divided
each of them in three periods of equal duration: the head, the middle
and the tail. We found that although most of the withdrawals tend
to be in the head of a burst, 50% of the bursts have at least 26% (resp.
10%) of their withdrawals in the middle (resp. in the tail). For 25%
of the bursts, at least 32% of the withdrawals are in the tail.
84% of the bursts includewithdrawals of prefixes announced
by “popular” ASes.We examined the Cisco “Umbrella 1 Million”
dataset [6] which lists the top 1 million most popular DNS domains.
From there, we extracted the organizations responsible for the top
100 domains: Google, Akamai, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook,
etc. (15 in total). 84% of the bursts we observed included at least
one withdrawal of a prefix announced by these organizations.
2.2.2 Slow BGP convergence lead to significant traffic losses.
While countless studies have shown that BGP convergence can
cause long downtime on data-plane connectivity [18, 37, 43, 45,
53, 62, 63, 66], we confirmed the data-plane impact of a few bursts
of withdrawals propagated by a national ISP (with more than 50
routers). Specifically, we analyzed the bursts sent by the ISP to its
BGP neighbors over a period of three months. Among them, we
selected three bursts which included more than 10k withdrawals
and which matched with an event logged by the ISP. By checking
their logs, the operators identified the root causes of the bursts:
two maintenance operations and a peering failure at one of their
Internet eXchange Points (IXPs). At least two of these three bursts
induced downtime for transit traffic towards up to 68k prefixes,
including popular destinations.
2.2.3 Operators care: a 72-operators survey.
To substantiate the effect of slow convergence on operational
practices, we performed an anonymous survey among 72 operators
coming from a broad variety of networks (ISPs, CDNs, IXPs, etc.)
and providing services to a large customer base: 33% of them con-
nect >1 million users, and 66% connect 10k users or more (see [33]
for details). The survey contained 17 questions grouped in three
topics: (i) the operators’ experiences with slow convergence; (ii)
the induced downtime; and (iii) their opinions on speeding up
convergence upon remote outages.
Operators care about slow convergence: 78% of the respondents
care about slow BGP convergence and actively aim at decreasing
their local convergence time by tweaking the various BGP timers (27
of them) or tuning the underlying TCP parameters (21); 41 respon-
dents use fast-detection mechanisms (BFD) and 21 of them deployed
fast-reroute techniques (BGP PIC [25] or MPLS fast-reroute [52]).
When considering transit networks (33 respondents), 67% of them
rely on fast-detection mechanisms, and 45% on fast-reroute.
Operators often observe slow convergence upon remote out-
ages: Among the 17 respondents who collect statistics about BGP
convergence (9 of which are transit ISPs), 52% observe an average
BGP convergence time upon remote outages above 30 s. Only 4 of
them experience average convergence time below 10 s. In addition,
87% of the respondents observe a worst convergence time above
1min, and 35% above 5min.
The vast majority of the operators would be interested in a
solution for remote outages like SWIFT: Namely, 95% of our
respondents indicated that they would consider adopting a fast-
reroute solution to speed up convergence upon remote outages.
3 OVERVIEW
Fig. 3 shows the workflow implemented by a SWIFTED router. We
now describe the result of implementing such workflow on the BGP
border router2 of AS 1 in Fig. 1.
Before the outage. The SWIFTED router in AS 1 continuously
pre-computes backup next-hops (consistently with BGP routes)
to use upon remote outages. This computation is done for each
prefix and considering any link on the corresponding AS path. For
example, the AS 1 router chooses AS 3 or AS 4 as backup next-hop
for rerouting the 20k prefixes advertised by AS 7 and AS 8 upon the
failure of link (1, 2). In contrast, it can only use AS 3 as backup to
protect against the failure of link (5, 6) for the same set of prefixes,
since AS 4 also uses (5, 6) prior to the failure. SWIFT then embeds a
data-plane tag into each incoming packet. Each SWIFT tag contains
the list of AS links to be traversed by the packet, along with the
backup next-hop to use in the case of any link failure.
Upon the outage. After receiving a few BGP withdrawals caused
by the failure of (5, 6), the SWIFTED router in AS 1 runs an inference
algorithm that quickly identifies a set of possibly disrupted AS links
and affected prefixes. The router then redirects the traffic for all
the affected prefixes to the pre-computed backup next-hops. To do
so, it uses a single forwarding rule matching the data-plane tags
installed on the packets. As a result, AS 1 reroutes the affected
traffic in less than 2 s (independently from the number of affected
prefixes), a small fraction of the time needed by BGP (see Table 1).
When rerouting, SWIFT does not propagate any message in BGP.
We proved that this is safe provided that the SWIFT inference is
sufficiently accurate (§3.3). When BGP has converged, i.e., the burst
2Without loss of generality, we assume that a single router in AS 1 maintains all the
BGP sessions with AS 2, AS 3 and AS 4.
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of withdrawals has been fully received and BGP routes have been
installed in the forwarding table, the router removes the forwarding
rules installed by SWIFT and falls back to the BGP ones.
In the following, we provide more details about the main compo-
nents of SWIFT. In §3.1, we overview the inference algorithm (fully
described in §4) and how its output is used in a SWIFTED router.
In §3.2, we illustrate how SWIFT quickly reroutes data-plane pack-
ets on the basis of tags pre-computed by the encoding algorithm
detailed in §5. We finally report about SWIFT guarantees in §3.3.
3.1 Inferring outages from few BGP messages
The SWIFT inference algorithm looks for peaks of activity in the
incoming stream of BGP messages. Each detected burst triggers
an analysis of its root cause. To identify the set of links with the
highest probability of being affected by an outage, the algorithm
combines the implicit and explicit information carried by BGP
messages about active and inactive paths. For example, the failure
of (5, 6) in Fig. 1 may cause BGP withdrawals indicating the un-
availability of paths (1, 2, 5, 6) and (1, 2, 5, 6, 8) for all the prefixes
originated by AS 6 and 8. Receiving these withdrawals makes the
algorithm assign a progressively higher failure probability to links
in {(1, 2), (2, 5), (5, 6), (6, 8)}. Over time, the algorithm decreases
the probability of links (1, 2) and (2, 5), because prefixes originated
by ASes 2 and 5 are not affected, and the probability of link (6, 8),
because not all the withdrawn paths traverse (6, 8).
SWIFT aims at inferring failures quickly, yet keeping an eye
on accuracy. Inference accuracy and speed are conflicting objec-
tives. Indeed, precisely inferring the set of affected AS links might
be impossible with few BGP messages, as they might not carry
enough information. For instance, SWIFT cannot reduce the set
of likely failed links any further than the entire path (1, 2, 5, 6, 8)
until it receives other messages than withdrawals for that path.
Rerouting based on partial information can unnecessarily shift non-
affected traffic, e.g., all the prefixes originated by ASes 2 and 5. In
contrast, waiting for BGP messages takes precious time (§2) during
which traffic towards actually-affected prefixes can be dropped.
To avoid unnecessary traffic shifts, SWIFT evaluates the like-
lihood that its inferences are realistic (e.g., using historical data).
For instance, SWIFT evaluates the probability that a burst includ-
ing withdrawals for all the prefixes originated by ASes 6, 7 and 8
happens. If a burst of similar size is unlikely, SWIFT waits for the
reception of more messages to confirm its inference. Given that
withdrawals for prefixes from AS 7 and 8 will likely be interleaved
with path updates for AS 6, this strategy quickly converges to an
accurate inference, as we show in §6.
SWIFT uses a conservative approach to translate inferences
into predictions of affected prefixes. Remote failures are often
partial, that is, an outage can cause traffic loss for a subset of the
prefixes traversing the affected link(s). For instance, a subset of the
prefixes traversing the failed link (5, 6) in Fig. 1 can remain active
because of physical link redundancy between AS 5 and 6, or be
rerouted by intermediate ASes (e.g., 5) to a known backup path (like
the prefixes originated by AS 7). As BGP messages do not contain
enough information to pinpoint the set of prefixes affected by an
outage, SWIFT reroutes all the prefixes traversing the inferred links.
Doing so minimizes downtime at the potential cost of short-lived
path sub-optimality (for a few minutes at most).
SWIFT inference works well in practice. Our experiments on
real BGP traces (see §6) show that SWIFT enables to reroute 90%
(median) of the affected prefixes after having received a small frac-
tion of the burst, and less than 0.60% of the non-affected prefixes.
3.2 Fast data-plane updates independently of
the number of affected destinations
Upon an inference, a SWIFTED router might need to update for-
warding rules for thousands of prefixes. In general, routers are slow
to perform such large rerouting operations as they update their
data-plane rules on a per-prefix basis.3 Previous studies [24, 64] re-
port median update time per-prefix between 128 and 282 µs. Hence,
current routers would take between 2.7 and 5.9 seconds to reroute
21k prefixes (as the router in AS 1 has to do in Fig. 1), and more
than 1 minute for the full Internet table (650k prefixes) – even if
BGP could converge instantaneously.
SWIFT speeds up data-plane updates by rerouting according
to packet tags instead of prefixes. A SWIFTED router relies on
a two-stage forwarding table to speed up data-plane updates. The
first stage contains rules for tagging traversing packets. SWIFT
tags carry two pieces of information: (i) the AS paths along which
they are currently forwarded; and (ii) the next-hops to use in the
absence (primary next-hops) or presence (backup next-hops) of any
AS-link failure. The second stage contains rules for forwarding the
packets according to these tags. By matching on portions of the
tags, a SWIFTED router can quickly select packets passing through
any given AS link(s), and reroute them to a pre-computed next-hop.
Since tags are only used within the SWIFTED router, they have local
meaning and are not propagated in the Internet (they are removed
at the egress of the SWIFTED router).
Using again Fig. 1, we now describe the rules in the forwarding
table of the SWIFTED router in AS 1. Fig. 3 shows the tags returned
by the SWIFT encoding algorithm. The first stage of the forwarding
table contains rules to add tags consistently with the used BGP
paths. Since prefixes in AS 8 are forwarded on path (2, 5, 6, 8), it
contains the following rule.
match(dst_prefix:in AS8) >> set(tag:00111 10011)
The first part of the tag identifies the AS path. It maps specific
subsets of bits to AS links in a given position of the AS path. The
first two bits represent the first link in the AS path, which is link
(2, 5). Consistently with Fig. 3, those bits are therefore set to 00.
Similarly the second and third bits represent link (5, 6) when it is
the second link in the AS path, etc.
The second part of the tag (in green) encodes the primary and
backup next-hops. Namely, the first bit identifies the primary next-
hop, the second bit indicates the backup next-hop to use if link (1, 2)
fails, etc. This part of the tag enables SWIFT to match on traffic
that may have to be redirected to potentially different next-hops
depending on the link that fails and the destination prefix.
3Since the outage affects remote AS links, local fast-rerouting techniques [25] cannot
be applied.
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Figure 3: SWIFT workflow.
Before the failure of (5, 6), the second stage only contains the
forwarding rules consistent with BGP. Specifically,
match(tag:***** 1****) >> fwd(2)
Upon the failure of (5, 6), SWIFT adds a single high-priority rule to
the second stage – while not modifying at all the first stage.
match(tag:*01** ***1*) >> fwd(3)
The added rule exploits the structure of SWIFT tags to reroute traffic
for all the affected 21k prefixes, at once. The regular expression in
it matches all the packets such that: (5, 6) appears as the second
link in their AS path (i.e., the tag starts with *01**); and the backup
next-hop is 3 (i.e., the tag ends with ***1*). This includes traffic
for prefixes in AS 6, 7 and 8. Note that one rule is sufficient in our
example, because the SWIFTED router does not use any AS path
where (5, 6) appears in other positions before the failure (otherwise,
one rule per position would have been needed).
SWIFT compresses tags efficiently. Assigning subsets of bits for
any AS link and possible position in the AS path does not scale
for the Internet AS graph that currently includes >220,000 AS
links. SWIFT encoding algorithm squeezes such graph in few bits
by leveraging two insights. First, many links in the AS graph are
crossed by few prefixes, and their failure does not lead to bursts
large enough to even require SWIFT fast-rerouting. SWIFT therefore
does not encode those links at all. Second, the AS paths used by a
single router at any given time tend to exhibit a limited number of
AS links per position. SWIFT therefore only encodes AS links and
positions that are present in the used BGP paths.
SWIFT supports rerouting policies. When computing backup
next-hops, SWIFT complies with rerouting policies specified by
the operators. Indeed, rerouting to a safe path may not always be
desirable in practice – e.g., because economically disadvantageous.
Rerouting policies express the preferences between backup next-
hops, or forbid the usage of specific ones—i.e., to mimic business
and peering agreements. For example, operators can prevent SWIFT
from: (i) using an expensive link with a provider rather than a more
convenient one with a customer; (ii) rerouting to a link where free
traffic is close to depletion (e.g., according to the 95th percentile
rule [50]); or (iii) moving high volumes of traffic to geographically
distant regions (e.g., by sending to a remote egress point).
SWIFT supports both local and remote backup next-hops. In
addition to reroute locally to a directly connected next-hop an-
nouncing an alternate route, a SWIFTED router can also fast-reroute
to remote next-hops, potentially at the other side of the network,
by using tunnels (e.g., IP or MPLS ones). Remote backup next-hops
are learned via plain iBGP sessions.
SWIFT is easy to deploy. Only a software update is required to
deploy SWIFT since recent router platforms readily support a two-
stage forwarding table [3]. In §7 we show that SWIFT can also be
deployed on any existing router by interposing a SWIFT controller
and an SDN switch between the SWIFTED router and its peers. The
two-stage forwarding table in that case spans two devices, similarly
to an SDX platform [30, 31].
3.3 Guarantees and limitations
We prove that SWIFT rerouting strictly improves Internet-wide con-
nectivity, proportionally to the number of SWIFTED routers. This
translates into incentives for both partial and long-term Internet-
scale deployment (e.g., on all AS border routers).
Theorem 3.1. The number of disrupted paths is decreased by every
SWIFTED router which is on a path affected by an outage.
Theorem 3.2. SWIFT rerouting causes no forwarding loop, irre-
spective of the set of SWIFTED routers.
Both theorems are based on the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. When any SWIFTED router fast-reroutes, it sends
packets over paths with no blackhole and loops.
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Proof sketch. Upon a remote outage, any SWIFTED router r
reroutes traffic to an AS path that was offered to r by one of its BGP
neighbors before the outage (by definition of SWIFT). This path
must have been free from blackholes and loops before the outage
(by definition of BGP). Also, it contains no failed links—provided
that the inference is accurate enough. Hence, the path remains valid
and used by all ASes in it, which directly yields the statement. □
As evident from the proof sketch, the lemma and consequently the
theorems hold under the following two assumptions (see [33]).
Assumption 1:During an outage, routers only change inter-domain
forwarding paths that are affected by the outage. If this assumption
is violated, then inter-domain loops can be generated. Let s be a
SWIFTED router and n the next-hop to which s fast-reroutes to
avoid a certain outage. If n switches path for some fast-rerouted
prefixes (e.g., to reflect a policy change uncorrelated with the out-
age), it may choose the BGP path used by s before the outage (not
updated by SWIFT): this would lead to a loop between n and s .
Nevertheless, SWIFT can quickly detect and mitigate such a loop:
s can monitor whether n stops offering the BGP path to which it
has fast-rerouted, and select another backup next-hop.
Assumption 2: SWIFT inferences enable the SWIFTED routers to
avoid paths affected by an outage. The SWIFT inference algorithm
implements a conservative approach for inferring links and select-
ing backup paths. Still, we cannot guarantee the validity of such
assumption, since SWIFT inferences are based on the partial and
potentially noisy information provided by BGP (and withdrawals
that reach different ASes at different times). Inferences that cause
SWIFT not to rule out all paths affected by an outage might induce
packet loss: in these cases, a SWIFTED router could reroute traffic
to a disrupted backup, and multiple SWIFTED routers could create
an inter-domain loop (if the selected backup next-hop actually uses
exactly one of the disrupted paths missed by the inference). In both
cases, packets will be dropped, as it would have happened for the
affected prefixes without SWIFT (i.e., using vanilla BGP). However,
our evaluation with both real BGP traces and controlled simulations
(§6), suggests that very few SWIFT inferences lead to the selection
of disrupted backup next-hops.
4 SWIFT INFERENCE ALGORITHM
We now detail the SWIFT inference algorithm, its basics (§4.1)
and how it accounts for real-world factors (§4.2). Because of space
constraints, we include the pseudo-code of the algorithm along
with the full proof of its correctness (Theorem 4.1) in [33].
4.1 Fast and sound inference
In the following, we consider the stream of messages received on a
single BGP session since the algorithm run on a per-session basis
(enabling parallelism). We also initially assume that the algorithm
aims at inferring an outage produced by a single failed link.
Burst detection. SWIFT monitors the received input stream of
BGP messages, looking for significant increases in the frequency
of withdrawals. It classifies a set of messages as the beginning of
a burst when such frequency (say, number of withdrawals per 10
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Figure 4: WS and PS metrics at the end of the burst of with-
drawals caused by the failure of (5,6).
seconds) in the input stream is higher than the 99.99th percentile
recorded in the recent history (e.g., during the previous month).
Failure localization. When detecting a burst, SWIFT infers the
corresponding failed link as the one maximizing a metric called Fit
Score (FS). Let t be the time at which this inference is done. For any
link l , the value of FS for l is the weighted geometric mean of the
Withdrawal Share (WS) and Path Share (PS):
FS(l , t) = (WS(l , t)wWS ∗ PS(l , t)wPS )1/(wWS+wPS )
WS is the fraction of prefixes forwarded over l that have been
withdrawn at t over all the received withdrawals. PS is the fraction
of withdrawn prefixes with a path via l at t over the prefixes with
a path via l at t . More precisely,
WS(l , t) = W (l , t)
W (t) PS(l , t) =
W (l , t)
W (l , t) + P(l , t)
whereW (l , t) is the number of prefixes whose paths include l and
have been withdrawn at t ;W (t) is the total number of withdrawals
received as of t ; P(l , t) is the number of prefixes whose paths still
traverse l at t . wWS and wPS are the weights we assign to WS
and PS. By relying on WS and PS, the fit score aims at quantifying
the relative probability that a link is responsible for the received
withdrawals while being robust to real-world factors such as BGP
noise (§4.2).
Example. Fig. 4 reports the WS and PS values at the end of the burst
of withdrawals generated by the failure of (5, 6) in Fig. 1. Link (5, 6)
is the only one with both WS and PS equal to 1, since all the AS
paths traversing it have been either withdrawn or changed with
another path not crossing (5, 6). In contrast, the PS values for links
(1, 2) and (2, 5) are smaller than 1 (11k/13k and 11k/12k), because
paths for the prefixes of AS 2 and AS 5 have not been modified
by the burst. The WS of (6, 8) is smaller than 1 because not all
the withdrawals pertain to that link. At the end, (5, 6) is therefore
correctly inferred as failed.
SWIFT inference is sound. By soundness, we mean that the in-
ference algorithm is always correct under ideal conditions. The
following theorem holds.
Theorem 4.1. If all ASes inject at least one prefix on every adjacent
link, SWIFT inference returns a set of links including the failed link if
run at the end of the corresponding stream of BGP messages.
Proof sketch. Let f be the failed link and t the time at which
all the BGP messages triggered by the failure of f are received.
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All prefixes that have been withdrawn were previously forwarded
over the f , hence WS(f ,t ) = 1. Also, all the prefixes previously
forwarded over f have been withdrawn (PS(f ,t ) = 1). This means
that the fit score of f has the maximum possible value, hence the
SWIFT inference algorithm returns it in the set of inferred links. □
4.2 Robustness to real-world factors
While actual streams of BGP messages do not always match the
ideal conditions assumed in Theorem 4.1, SWIFT inferences are
good in practice (see §6). We now explain why.
SWIFTmakes accurate inferences during the burst. Contrary
to the assumptions of Theorem 4.1, SWIFT runs its inference algo-
rithm at the beginning of a burst. Lack of information (i.e., carried by
not yet received withdrawals) can therefore affect its accuracy. Be-
ing aware of this lack of information, SWIFT uses different weights
for WS and PS in the geometric mean calculated in the fit score FS
(see §4.1). The key intuition is that early on during the burst, a large
number prefixes are not yet withdrawn and are still using the failed
link. As a result, the PS for that link may not be the highest one.
The PS for the failed link actually increases when SWIFT runs the
inference later in the burst. However, the WS for the failed link will
always be greater or equal than the WS of any other link, provided
that SWIFT does not receive unrelated withdrawals and that the
outage is produced by a single link failure. SWIFT thus performs
better whenwWS > wPS .
By performing a calibration study on real BGP data, we found
that SWIFT performed better when wWS was three times higher
than wPS (see details in [33]). We therefore use this weight for
SWIFT, including in the evaluation (§6).
SWIFTminimizes the risk of inferring awrong link by being
adaptive. As discussed in §3, the accuracy of SWIFT inferences
depends on the amount of information in its input.
SWIFT uses the number of withdrawals in an ongoing burst as an
estimation of the carried information. It launches a first inference
after a fixed number of withdrawals, which we call triggering thresh-
old. If the likelihood of seeing an inferred burst of that size is high
enough with respect to historical data, then it returns the inferred
link. Otherwise, it waits for another fixed number of withdrawals,
and iterates. Using real BGP bursts as baseline (see [33]), we set
the default values of the triggering threshold to 2.5k withdrawals.
Also, SWIFT returns the inferred link if the number of predicted
withdrawals is less than 10k for 2.5k received withdrawals, 20k for
5k received, 50k for 7.5k received, and 100k for 10k received. After
having received 20k withdrawals, SWIFT returns the inferred link
regardless of the number of predicted prefixes.
SWIFT applies a conservative strategy if failed links cannot
be univocally determined. It may happen that SWIFT cannot
distinguish precisely which link has failed. For example, in Fig. 4,
assuming that the 1k prefixes from AS 6 are updated and not with-
drawn, SWIFT cannot distinguish if (5, 6) or (6, 8) failed. Whenever
a failed link cannot be univocally determined, SWIFT inference
returns all the links with maximum FS, i.e., both (5, 6) and (6, 8) in
the previous example.
SWIFT quantitativemetrics mitigate the effect of BGP noise.
Some received BGP messages may be unrelated to the outage caus-
ing a burst but due to contingent factors (e.g., misconfiguration,
router bugs). They constitute noise that can negatively affect the
accuracy of any inference algorithm. In SWIFT, noise can distort FS
values. In Fig. 4, for instance, withdrawals for prefixes originated
by AS 5 can be received by AS 1 during the depicted burst. This
would increase the likelihood that the FS of (2, 5) is higher than the
one of (5, 6), especially at the beginning of the burst.
In practice, SWIFT is robust to realistic noise as the level of
BGP noise is usually much lower than a burst. Hence, its effect
on quantitative metrics like FS, WS, and PS, tends to rapidly drop.
This feature distinguishes our inference algorithm from simpler
approaches, e.g., based on AS-path intersection, which are much
more sensible to single unrelated withdrawals.
SWIFT can infer concurrent link failures. To cover cases like
router failures that affect multiple links at the same time, the in-
ference algorithm computes the FS value for sets of links sharing
one endpoint. More precisely, the algorithm aggregates greedily
links with a common endpoint (from links with the highest FS to
those with the lowest one), until the FS for all the aggregated links
does not increase anymore. The fit score FS for any set S of links is
computed by extending the definition of WS and PS as follows.
WS(S, t) =
∑
l ∈S
W (l , t)
W (t) PS(S, t) =
∑
l ∈S
W (l , t)∑
l ∈S
W (l , t) + P(l , t)
The set of links (potentially, with a single element) with the highest
FS is returned. To ensure safety (see §3.3), for each link inferred,
SWIFT must choose a backup route that does not traverse the
common endpoint of the links.4 This prevents SWIFT to reroute a
prefix to a backup next-hop that uses another inferred link (because
all the inferred links have a common endpoint). By choosing backup
paths bypassing a superset of the inferred links, SWIFT also ensures
safety in case the inference algorithm correctly localizes the ASes
involved in the outage instead of the precise links.
5 SWIFT ENCODING ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe how SWIFT tags are computed. Recall
that these tags are embedded onto the incoming packets in the
first stage of the forwarding table and are split in two parts: one
which encodes the AS links used by the packet, and another which
encodes the next-hops to reroute to should any of these links fail.
Thanks to these embedded tags, a SWIFTED router can reroute
traffic efficiently upon an inference, independently on the number
of prefixes impacted.
In section 7, and similarly to [30, 31], we show how SWIFT
can leverage the destination MAC to tag incoming traffic. The
destination MAC is indeed a good “tag carrier” as it provides a
significant number of bits (48), and can easily be removed in the
second stage of the forwarding table by rewriting it to the MAC
address of the actual next-hop, as any IP router would do.
4This is enough to ensure safety. However, SWIFT computes the backup next-hops in
advance, i.e., before the failure (see §3.2). As SWIFT does not know which endpoint of a
link will be the common endpoint, it chooses backup paths (for the prefixes traversing
this link) avoiding both endpoints of the link.
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Figure 5: A SWIFTED router embeds a tag into incoming
packets. The tag encodes the links traversed by the packet
(Part 1) alongwith backupnext-hops for each of the encoded
links (Part 2).
Encoding AS links. The first part of the tag (right side of Fig. 5)
encodes the AS path along which each packet will flow. For each
prefix, we consider the AS path associated with the best route for it,
and we store the position of ASes in that path. Namely, we definem
sets, withm being the length of the longest AS path, and we call the
i-th set position i . For any AS path (u0 u1 . . .uk ), with k ≤ m, we
then add the AS identifier of ui to position i , for every i = 1, . . . ,k .
Note that the first hop in any AS path is already represented as
primary next-hop (see Part 2 of Fig. 5). Hence, we do not model
position 1, and we have a different AS-path encoding for every
SWIFT’s neighbor. At the end of this process, AS paths can be
encoded by selecting specific AS identifiers for every position.
Encoding all used AS paths may not be possible. Not only can
thousands of distinct ASes be seen for each position, but also the AS
paths may be very long (>10 hops). Fortunately, two observations
enable SWIFT to considerably reduce the required number of bits.
First, from the perspective of one router, many AS links carry few
prefixes. A failure of these links will therefore produce small bursts
(if any), which allows for per-prefix update. Thus, we ignore any
link that carries less than 1,500 prefixes in our SWIFT encoding.
Second, links that are far away from the SWIFTED node are less
likely to produce bursts of withdrawals than closer ones. Indeed,
for distant links, it is likely that intermediate nodes know a backup
path. Our measurements (§6) confirm this. Consequently, we only
encode the first few hops of the AS paths (up to position 5).
For the remaining AS links, SWIFT encodes first the links with
the highest number of prefixes traversing them. To do that, SWIFT
uses an adaptive number of bits for each AS position: each position
is implemented by a different bit group, whose length depends
on the number of ASes in this position. For each position P , we
map all the ASes in P to a specific value (the AS identifier) of the
corresponding bit group. Hence, the size of this group is equal to
the number of bits needed to represent all the values in P .
Encoding backup next-hops. The second part of the tag (left
side of Fig. 5) identifies the primary next-hop as well as backup
next-hops for each encoded AS link. For each prefix p, the pri-
mary next-hop is directly extracted as the first hop in the AS path
for p. For instance, the primary next-hop for prefix p1 in Fig. 1(a)
is 2. Backup next-hops are explicitly represented to both reflect
rerouting policies and prevent rerouting to disrupted backup paths.
Consider again p1. The primary path is (2, 5, 6). To protect against
a failure of the first AS link (2, 5), we can select AS 3 or 4, since
neither of the two uses (2, 5) to reach p1. In contrast, for (5, 6), only
AS 3 can be used as a backup next-hop, since the AS paths received
from AS 4 also uses (5, 6).
Partitioning bits across the two parts of the tag. A fundamen-
tal tradeoff exists between the amount of paths and the number of
backup next-hops that any SWIFT router can encode. On the one
hand, allocating more bits to represent AS links (first part of the
tag) allows a SWIFTED router to cover more remote failures. On the
other hand, allocating more bits to represent (backup) next-hops
(second part of the tag) allows a SWIFTED router to reroute traffic
to a higher number of backup paths.
In §6.4, we show that allocating 18 bits to AS paths encoding is
sufficient to reroute more than 98% of the prefixes. Assuming 48-
bits tags (i.e., , using the destination MAC), 30 bits are left to encode
backup next-hops. If we configure SWIFT to support remote failures
up to depth 4, the bits allocated for the backup next-hops needs
to be divided by 5 (1 primary + 4 backup next-hops). As a result,
30/5 = 6 bits are reserved for each depth, which translates into
26 = 64 possible next-hops. If one wants to consider remote failures
only up to depth 3, then the number of next-hops is 27 = 128 and
two more bits can be allocated to the AS links encoding. Operators
can fine-tune such decision, e.g., based on the (expected) number
of backup next-hops reachable by each SWIFTED router.
6 EVALUATION
We now evaluate our Python-based implementation (≈ 3,000 lines
of code) of the SWIFT inference algorithm (§4) and the encoding
scheme (§5). We first describe our datasets (§6.1). We then evaluate
the accuracy of the inference algorithm, both in terms of failure
localization (§6.2) and withdrawals prediction (§6.3). We also eval-
uate the efficiency of SWIFT data-plane encoding (§6.4). Finally,
we show that the combination of the inference algorithm and the
encoding scheme leads to much faster convergence than BGP (§6.5).
6.1 Datasets
We evaluate SWIFT using two sources of bursts of BGP withdrawals.
Bursts from real BGP data, without outage ground truth. To
evaluate how SWIFT would work in the wild, we use sets of actual
bursts extracted from the same dataset used in §2. It consists of
BGP messages dumped by 10 RouteViews [51] and 5 RIPE RIS [9]
collectors during the full month of November 2016. These collectors
received BGP messages from 213 peers.5 Our evaluation is based
on 1,802 bursts with more than 1,500 withdrawals. Amongst them,
942 (resp. 339) have more than 2,500 (resp. 15,000) withdrawals.
5We found 5 routers peering with these collectors that exhibit a flapping behavior,
with an anomalous large number of bursts of similar pattern; when including them, we
obtain a minimal change in overall results (≈2%), but since SWIFT performs uniformly
on similar bursts, their large number (≈500 bursts) causes a significant skew in the
population of bursts. We therefore omit these peers from our analysis.
SIGCOMM ’17, August 21-25, 2017, Los Angeles, CA, USA T. Holterbach et al.
Bursts from simulations, with outage ground truth. To vali-
date the accuracy and the robustness of our inference algorithm,
we use bursts extracted from control-plane simulations conducted
with C-BGP [56]. We created a topology composed of 1,000 ASes
using the Hyperbolic Graph Generator [10]. We set the average
node degree to 8.4, which is the value observed in the CAIDA AS-
level topology [16] in October 2016, and use as degree distribution a
power law with exponent 2.1 [42]. We defined the AS relationships
as follows. The three ASes with highest degree are Tier1 ASes and
are fully-meshed. ASes directly connected to a Tier1 are Tier2s.
ASes directly connected to a Tier2 but not to a Tier1 are Tier3s,
etc. Two connected ASes have a peer-to-peer relationship if they
are on the same level, otherwise they have a customer-provider
relationship. We configured each AS to originate 20 prefixes, for
a total of 20k prefixes. Using C-BGP, we simulated random link
failures, and recorded the BGP messages seen on each BGP session
in the network. We collected a total of 2,183 bursts of at least 1k
withdrawals. The median (resp. max) size of the bursts is 2,184 (resp.
19,215) withdrawals.
6.2 Failure localization accuracy
In the following, we evaluate the accuracy of the SWIFT inference
algorithm on both datasets.
6.2.1 Validation on real BGP data.
Since real BGP traces do not provide the ground truth on burst
root causes, we estimate the accuracy of the inference algorithm
indirectly: we evaluate the match between the prefixes withdrawn
in the entire burstW and the prefixesW ′ whose path traversed
the links inferred by SWIFT as failed. This can be formalized as a
binary classification problem, in which the true and false positives
are the prefixes inW ′ ∩W andW ′ −W , respectively. We therefore
evaluate the accuracy of SWIFT inference in terms of True Positive
Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR).6
Fig. 6 shows the TPR and FPR on a per-burst basis. It is divided
into quadrants. The top left quadrant corresponds to very good
inferences, i.e., for each burst, the links that SWIFT infers as failed
are traversed by most of the withdrawn prefixes (high TPR) and
few of the non-affected prefixes (low FPR). The top right quadrant
contains inferences that overestimate the extent of a failure (high
TPR and FPR): rerouting upon such inferences is still beneficial as
the TPR is high (i.e., connectivity is restored for many prefixes actu-
ally disrupted). The bottom left quadrant corresponds to inferences
that underestimate the extent of a burst. Finally, the bottom right
quadrant includes bad inferences (with low TPR and high FPR).
We evaluate two scenarios for SWIFT. In the first one (Fig. 6(a)),
the inference algorithm runs only once, after 2.5k withdrawals—as it
would do without a history model (e.g., after the first installation on
a router). In the second scenario (Fig. 6(b)), the inference algorithm
runs every 2.5k withdrawals while following the simple historical
model we described in §4.2. When considering history, SWIFTwaits
for more withdrawals to arrive before rerouting large numbers of
prefixes early on in the burst.
6T PR = T P/(T P + FN ), F PR = F P/(F P +T N ); The negatives are all the prefixes
announced in the session before the burst starts and not withdrawn during the burst.
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Figure 6: Despite having little information, SWIFT inference
is accurate. The vast majority of prefixes are correctly in-
ferred as failed (top half quadrants). While some affected
prefixes are missed (bottom left), no prediction is signifi-
cantly inaccurate (bottom right).
SWIFTmakes accurate inferences in themajority of the cases,
and never makes bad inferences. Even when using only 2.5k
withdrawals (Fig. 6(a)), SWIFT makes accurate inferences in the
vast majority of the cases: TPR is more than 60% for more than 81%
of the bursts. However, it also overestimates the extent of the burst
(FPR is higher than 50%) for about 12% of the bursts. SWIFT infer-
ence algorithm performs sensibly better when relying on history
(Fig. 6(b)). Better performance comes at the price of missing some
bursts because of the extra delay. Specifically, it missed a total of 256
bursts (53% of them smaller than 5k) compared to the history-less
version. Despite this, the history-based version of the inference
algorithm still completes the inference at the lowest threshold (2.5k)
for the majority of the bursts (65%). The increased density of the top
left quadrant in Fig. 6(b) is a clear indication of the gain obtained
by trading a bit of speed for better accuracy. Finally, we stress that
SWIFT never falls into the bottom right quadrant, irrespective of
whether the historical model is used or not.
6.2.2 Validation through simulation.
We now describe the results obtained by SWIFT inference algo-
rithm when run on the bursts generated in C-BGP (see §6.1).
Under ideal conditions, SWIFT inference is always correct.
We ran our inference algorithm at the end of each burst and found
that the inference is always correct, consistently with Theorem 4.1.
SWIFT inference is accurate enough to ensure safety, even
early on during the bursts.Whenwe ran the inference algorithm
after only 200 withdrawals (1% of the total number of prefixes
advertised, see §6.1), SWIFT identified a superset of the failed link
for 9% of the bursts. For the remaining 91%, it returned a set of links
adjacent to the failed one. Nevertheless, for all the 2,183 bursts but
one, SWIFT selected a backup path that bypasses the actual failed
link. This is because SWIFT chooses a backup route that does not
traverse the common endpoint of the inferred links (see §4.2).
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percentile of bursts
10th 20th 30th 50th 70th 80th 90th
Burst size between 2.5k and 15k
CPR 24.6% 48.9% 72.6% 89.5% 98.5% 99.7% 99.9%
FPR 0% 0.03% 0.07% 0.22% 0.50% 0.81% 1.8%
CP 47 178 349 901 2.1k 3.0k 4.3k
FP 24 125 301 802 2.2k 3.1k 5.0k
Burst size greater than 15k
CPR 5.6% 39.3% 80.4% 93.0% 98.1% 99.7% 99.9%
FPR 0% 0% 0.04% 0.60% 5.42% 13.9% 74.9%
CP 1.7k 5.7k 11.0k 19.6k 53.2k 78.1k 193k
FP 0 6 110 2.4k 19.8k 50k 402k
Table 2: Inference algorithm with history model: perfor-
mance of the prediction of future withdrawals.
SWIFT inference is robust to noise.We simulated BGP noise by
adding, in each burst, 1,000 withdrawals of prefixes that are not
affected by the failure. This number is much greater than what we
observe in real BGP data, both in absolute terms (9 withdrawals
only in the 90th percentile, see §2.2) and as a percentage (since we
only advertise 20k prefixes in C-BGP, whereas there are more than
600k prefixes advertised in the real world [5]). When we triggered
the inference at the end of the burst, SWIFT identified the failed link
for 91% of the bursts (1991), a superset for 9% bursts (188), a set of
links adjacent to the failed one for 1 burst and did a wrong inference
for 3 bursts. When we triggered the inference after 200 withdrawals,
SWIFT still selected backup paths that bypass the actual failed link
for all the bursts but one. SWIFT identified a superset of the failed
link for 12% of the bursts, while for the remaining 88%, it returned
a set of links adjacent to the failed one.
6.3 Withdrawals prediction accuracy
In the previous section (§6.2), we showed that SWIFT inference
algorithm is indeed able to identify the failed link, even with limited
information. In this section, we evaluate the ability of SWIFT to pre-
dict withdrawals, we also give the absolute number of prefixes fast
rerouted upon such inference, enabling us to quantify the benefit
of SWIFT, as well as the possible under/overshooting induced.
Differently from the previous section, in order to evaluate specif-
ically the prediction, we consider as “positives” only the prefixes
withdrawn after the inference was made. This change affects the
definition of TP (and TPR) but leaves FP (FPR) unaltered. Since we
already used TPR in §6.2, we denote with CPR (for Correctly Pre-
dicted Rate) the true positive rate of the prediction. We also denote
with CP and FP, the total numbers of prefixes correctly predicted
or not, respectively.
6.3.1 Validation on real BGP data.
Table 2 shows results obtained by running the SWIFT inference
algorithm with the history model. Results for small (≤15k) and
large (>15k) bursts are shown separately.
SWIFT correctly fast-reroutes a large number of affected pre-
fixes. For half (resp. 80%) of the small bursts, SWIFT correctly pre-
dicts at least 89.5% (resp. 48.9%) of the future prefix withdrawals.
For half (resp. 80%) of the large bursts, SWIFT correctly predicts at
least 93% (resp. 39.3%) of the future prefix withdrawals. In terms
of absolute numbers, we see that SWIFT correctly fast-reroutes a
significant amount of prefixes, especially for larger (>15k) bursts,
where the number of prefixes predicted is in the order of tens of
thousands for 60% of the bursts and in the order of hundreds of
thousands for more than 10%.
SWIFT only reroutes a small number of non-affected pre-
fixes. Both for small and large bursts, the fraction of fast-rerouted
prefixes that were not affected by the failure is small in most of the
cases. In few cases (e.g., 90-th percentile of the large bursts) however,
the algorithm significantly overestimates the number of prefixes
to be rerouted (FP). This is because we deliberately designed and
tuned the algorithm to not minimize incorrectly rerouted prefixes in
order to avoid missing prefixes that should be rerouted. Incorrectly
rerouted prefixes are indeed forwarded to a backup path which
is sub-optimal but not disrupted, just for the few minutes needed
for BGP to reconverge. Consistently, we note that less aggressive
weights do reduce the FPR (see [33]).
6.3.2 Validation through simulation.
We now evaluate the accuracy of the prefixes prediction on the
bursts generated by C-BGP.
SWIFT accurately predicts prefix withdrawals, even when
considering noise.When inferring the affected prefixes after only
200 withdrawals, the FPR is equal to 0% for 98% of the bursts. The
highest FPR observed is only 13%. In the median case (resp. 25th
percentile), the CPR is equal to 88% (resp. 84%). The lowest CPR
observed is 37%.
To consider the impact of BGP noise on these numbers, we added,
to each burst, 1,000withdrawals unrelated to the failure (as in §6.2.2).
We found that, for 53% of the bursts, the FPR is still 0%. The FPR
is greater than 9% for only 1% of the bursts. In the median case
(resp. 25th percentile), the CPR is 53% (resp. 50%). The CPR is far
from 100% because the withdrawals unrelated to the failure count
as positives. In practice, we observe that the CPR is less affected by
BGP noise, as the level of noise is usually much lower (see §2.2).
6.4 Encoding effectiveness
We now experimentally evaluate SWIFT encoding scheme (§5) by
quantifying how many prefixes can effectively be rerouted in the
data-plane by matching on the pre-provisioned tags. For each burst,
we define the encoding performance, as the fraction of predicted
prefixes that can be rerouted by the encoding scheme. The perfor-
mance depends on the number of bits allocated to the AS path part
of the tag (see §5). For this part of the evaluation, we rely on the
inference algorithm with the history model and consider the bursts
obtained from the real BGP data.
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Figure 7: With only 18 bits available for the AS paths encod-
ing, SWIFT can reroutemore than 98.7% of the predicted pre-
fixes in the median case.
Allocating 18 bits to the AS-path part of the tag enables to
reroute 98.7% of the predicted prefixes. Fig. 7 shows the encod-
ing performance (over all bursts) as a function of the number of
bits reserved for the AS-path part of the tag. Each box shows the
inter-quartile range of the encoding performance: the line in the
box depicts the median value; the dot depicts the mean; and the
whiskers show the 5th and 95th percentiles. As the number of bits
allocated to the AS paths encoded increases, so does the encoding
performance. We see that 18 bits are already sufficient to reroute
98.7% of the predicted prefixes in the median case (73.9% in average).
These results illustrate that the compression done by the encoding
algorithm is efficient and manages to encode the vast majority of
the relevant AS links. In addition, Fig. 7 shows that for the large
bursts of at least 10k withdrawals, the encoding performance is bet-
ter (84.0% on average with 18 bits). This is explained by the design
of our encoding algorithm, which encodes with highest priority the
AS links with the largest number of prefixes traversing them (and
which may cause large bursts in case of a failure).
Assuming a tag of 48 bits (e.g., using the destination MAC), the
remaining 30 bits can be used to encode the backup next-hops. If
SWIFT encodes up to depth 4 (i.e., position 5 in the AS path), 64
different next-hops can therefore be used. This suggests that SWIFT
encoding can work well even if the SWIFTED device is connected to
a large number of external neighbors, like in IXPs [47]. The number
of backup next-hops can even be increased by reducing the number
of AS hops encoded (e.g., up to depth 3 instead of 4).
6.5 Rerouting speed
In this section, we show that the combination of the SWIFT infer-
ence algorithm and the encoding scheme enables fast convergence
in practice (within 2 s) by quantifying: (i) the learning time required
for a prediction; and (ii) the number of rules updates to perform in
the data plane. Our results are computed on the bursts in the real
BGP data.
SWIFT learns enough information to converge within 2 sec-
onds (median). Compared to vanilla BGP, SWIFT converges much
faster than a BGP router working at the per-prefix level. Fig. 8
shows the CDF of the time elapsed between the beginning of the
burst and the actual time at which every withdrawal in the burst is
learned. For BGP, the learning time corresponds to the withdrawal
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Figure 8: SWIFT quickly learns about remote outages. In 2
(resp. 9) seconds, SWIFT learns more than 50% (resp. 75%) of
the withdrawals, BGP needs 13 seconds (resp. 32 seconds).
timestamp. For SWIFT, it corresponds to the prediction time if the
withdrawal is predicted, otherwise the withdrawal timestamp. The
plot highlights that, in the median case, SWIFT learns a withdrawal
within 2 s, while BGP needs 13 s. We can observe a shift at 41 s in
the SWIFT curve. After investigation, we found that this is due to
a very large burst of 570k withdrawals which took a total of 105 s
to arrive. The first 20k withdrawals (needed for SWIFT to launch
the prediction) took 41 s to arrive. Observe that, even in such a
case, SWIFT was still able to shave off more than 1min of potential
downtime.
SWIFT requires few data-plane updates to reroute all the
predicted prefixes. The number of data-plane updates required to
reroute all the predicted prefixes depends on the number of failed
AS links reported by the inference algorithm. When executing the
inference algorithm after 2.5k withdrawals, in 29% of the cases, the
number of links predicted is 1 and the median number (resp. 90th
percentile) is 4 (resp. 29). For each reported link, one data-plane
update is required for each backup next-hop (§5). As a result, in
the median case (resp. 90-th percentile) and with 16 backup next-
hops, 64 (resp. 464) data-plane updates are required. Considering
a median update time per-prefix between 128 and 282 µs [24, 64],
SWIFT can update all the forwarding entries within 130 ms.
7 CASE STUDY
In this section, we showcase the benefits of SWIFT by boosting the
convergence time of a recent Cisco router. As mentioned in §3.2,
SWIFT can be implemented directly on existing routers via a simple
software update, since the only hardware requirement, a two-stage
forwarding table, is readily available in recent platforms [3] (we
confirmed this implementation through discussion with a major
router vendor). Yet, to evaluate SWIFT without waiting for vendors
to implement it, we developed an alternative deployment scheme.
How to SWIFT any existing router. In our alternative deploy-
ment scheme, we interpose a SWIFT controller and an SDN switch
between the SWIFTED router and its peers, respectively at the
control- and data-plane level (as in Fig. 9(b)). The setup is akin to
the SDX platform [30, 31]. It enables to deploy SWIFT on any router
that supports BGP and ARP, that is, virtually any router.
Upon reception of the BGP updates coming from the peers of
the SWIFTED router, the controller assigns 48-bit tags according to
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Figure 9: While a recent router takes 110 seconds to con-
verge upon a large remote outage (left), the corresponding
SWIFTED router (using the alternative deployment scheme
depicted on the right) converges within 2 seconds.
the SWIFT encoding scheme (see §5). The controller programs the
SWIFTED router to embed the data-plane tags in the destination
MAC field in the header of incoming packets, using the same tech-
nique as in a SDX [31] (i.e.,with BGP and ARP). It also programs the
SDN switch to route the traffic based on the tags, and rewrite the
destination MAC address with the one of the actual next-hop. The
two-stage forwarding table used by SWIFT then spans two devices:
the SWIFTED router (first stage) and the SDN switch (second stage).
Upon the detection of a burst coming from a peer, the SWIFT
controller runs the inference algorithm (§4), and provisions data-
plane rules to the SDN switch for rerouting the traffic. Our SWIFT
controller uses ExaBGP [7] to maintain BGP sessions.
Methodology. We reproduced the topology in Fig. 1(a) with a re-
cent router (Cisco Nexus 7k C7018, running NX-OS v6.2) acting
as AS 1, which we connected to its peers via a laptop running a
(software-based) OpenFlow switch (OpenVSwitch 2.1.3). We con-
figured AS 6 to announce 290k prefixes. Then, we failed the link
(5, 6), and we measured the downtime using the same technique as
in §2 (sending traffic to 100 randomly selected IP addresses).
A 98% speed-up. Fig. 9(a) reports the downtime observed by the
SWIFTED and non-SWIFTED Cisco router. While the vanilla Cisco
router takes 109 s to converge, the SWIFTED Cisco router system-
atically converges within 2 s—a 98% speed-up.
8 RELATEDWORK
RootCauseAnalysis (RCA). Many prior works aim at identifying
the root cause of failures, be it in the Internet [14, 15, 19, 23, 36, 39,
40, 68–70], or within a network [20, 41, 59, 67]. SWIFT inference
algorithm differs from previous works both in objectives and scope.
To enable fast rerouting, SWIFT inference should be extremely
quick (in seconds or sub-seconds), while previous works typically
focus on a much longer timescale (minutes). Moreover, SWIFT deals
with a specific type of failures, those generating large bursts of BGP
withdrawals, and only rely on the BGP messages reaching a single
vantage point (the SWIFTED router). In contrast, previous RCA
efforts typically use active measurements and multiple vantage
points. They also focus on pinpointing different problems such as
per-prefix path changes [36] or failures on the reverse path [39].
Another important difference is that SWIFT actually uses its
fast RCA core to repair Internet connectivity problems (almost in
real time). Doing so goes beyond previous contributions, like [34],
which only show how to detect (not repair) path problems out of
passive packet-level traces collected from a single vantage point.
BGP convergence. Slow BGP convergence is a well-known prob-
lem [17, 22, 29, 44, 45, 48]. Most prior work aimed at reducing BGP
convergence timewithin a single domain, for instance, upon planned
maintenance or internal link failures. For example, LOUP [32] im-
proved internal BGP convergence by ordering external route up-
dates to avoid transient loops. SWIFT complements and generalizes
these approaches by speeding-up local rerouting upon remote fail-
ures. SWIFT goals are similar to R-BGP [44] which enables faster
failover in inter-domain routing by pre-computing and propagating
few disjoint failover paths. Unlike SWIFT though, R-BGP is not
compatible with existing routers: it may also require many paths
to be propagated Internet-wide and stored in routers.
BGP burstiness. Several works [15, 23, 46, 49] focused on bursts of
BGP messages with the goal of studying per-prefix instabilities and
dynamics. They define an update burst as a sequence of messages
pertaining to a single prefix and observed within a given timeout.
Our goal with SWIFT is different, as we focus on events generating
concurrent withdrawals related to distinct prefixes.
Fast data-plane updates. Several techniques can speed up for-
warding rule modification upon local failures. For example, MPLS
fast reroute [52], IP fast reroute [11, 61] and PIC [25] can react in
sub-second to local link failures by pre-provisioning backup entries
and selectively activate them at runtime. SDN approaches, like Fat-
Tire [57], support the same use case in OpenFlow. None of these
works can fast reroute upon remote failures—as SWIFT does.
9 CONCLUSION
We presented SWIFT, the first fast-reroute framework for remote
outages. SWIFT is based on two key contributions: (i) a fast and
accurate inference algorithm; and (ii) a novel encoding scheme.
We performed a thorough evaluation of SWIFT using a fully
functional implementation and real BGP data. Our results indicate
that SWIFT is efficient in practice: it achieves a prediction accuracy
and an encoding efficiency both above 90%, and can boost the
convergence performance of a Cisco router by up to 98%.
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